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28 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE

SUBJECT: Liaison With the British in Washington on Projects FIEND and VALUABLE.

1. In connection with the formulation of policy relating to liaison with the new SIS representative at the British Embassy, the following points are mentioned in order to permit the development of a system which will safeguard OPC interests to the maximum degree:

a. Field relations with respect to FIEND/VALUABLE:

(1) The general policy is one of operational disengagement but close coordination with respect to both policy and operational intelligence.

(2) OPC field personnel working on Project FIEND are in close contact with their British opposites [] and []

(3) A certain amount of joint planning is done in order to prevent interference between British and American operations in the operational area. This involves the prompt exchange of intelligence relating to team movements, proposed drop zones and infiltration areas, political activities of teams and similar matters.

b. Relations in London:

(1) The OPC liaison officer handling FIEND/VALUABLE with SIS in London holds an SIS Pass which gives him free access to SIS Headquarters at all times and allows him to come and go as he pleases. He is received by all SIS Headquarters personnel dealing with FIEND and has ready access to them at their offices.

(2) The FIEND liaison officer in London is freely given operational and other information relating to VALUABLE and to Albania.

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(3) The FIEND liaison officer deals directly with the British in regard to certain matters outside the scope of FIEND itself, such as the recruiting of Polish crews and personnel for miscellaneous OPC needs in the Balkan area and Germany. Because of the close personal relationship which he has established, he has been able to receive numerous favors and assistance of a type which is extremely useful to OPC and which it would be desirable to continue to receive.

c. Relations in Washington:

(1) Until [] departure from Washington, FIEND/VALUABLE liaison was conducted directly between [] and []. During [] absences from Washington, such liaison was conducted with [] the British Embassy. This system was already in operation when [] reported for duty in April 1950, and was continued throughout the balance of Mr. Philby's tour in Washington.

(2) The system in use with [] resulted in prompt action on all matters of mutual concern to FIEND and VALUABLE. In the event OPC wished to see [] he was requested by telephone to come to [] office. In the event [] had something to bring up, he telephoned for an appointment and a meeting was immediately arranged.

2. It is quite possible that FIEND/VALUABLE is unique among OPC projects in regard to the close liaison which is required with the British and the fact that certain phases of the operation have depended to some degree on British good will. If it is proposed to restrict [] access to OPC offices, it is strongly recommended that this be done in such a manner as to avoid retaliatory treatment in London which could interfere with the smooth course of FIEND/VALUABLE relations there. It is naturally desirable to maintain close control over OPC contacts with the SIS representative in Washington. The object of this memo is merely to point out that if a new system is introduced which suggests an abrupt change in attitude toward working with the SIS representative, it may have repercussions in London which will affect the work of the FIEND liaison officer there.

[] Chief, EE-1 []

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